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Abstract
This paper proposes an improved approach to our previous work [11]. [11] uses Stackelberg game
to model the interactions between electricity retailer and its customers and genetic algorithms are
used to obtain the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). In this paper, we propose a bi-level programming
model by considering benefits of the electricity retailer (utility company) and its customer. In
the upper level model, the electricity retailer determines the real-time retail prices with the aim
to maximize its profit. The customer reacts to the prices announced by the retailer aiming to
minimize their electricity bills in the lower level model. In order to make it more tractable, we
convert the hierarchical bi-level programming problem into one single level problem by replacing
the lower lever’s problem with his Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. A branch and bound
algorithm is chosen to solve the resulting single level problem. Experimental results show that
both the bi-level programming model and the solution method are feasible. Compared with the
genetic algorithm approach proposed in work [11], the branch and bound algorithm in this paper
is more efficient in finding the optimal solution.
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1 Introduction
The traditional electricity grid is facing many existing and potential problems with the
increased demand from customers in recent years, and the reliability of the grid has been
put in danger. In addition, the average household electricity load has the potential to double
with the deployment of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), which will further endanger
the existing grid.
Instead of building more power plants to meet the peak demand of customers, demand
response is a better choice for solving the above problems, especially with the development
of the smart grid.
Real-time pricing (RTP) is one of the most important DR strategies, where the prices
announced by retailers change typically hourly to reflect variations of the price in the
wholesale market over time. Generally, customers are notified of RTP prices the day before
or a few hours before the delivery time. One of the most typical types of RTP is day-ahead
RTP, in which customers receive the prices for the next 24 hours [6].
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There exists much literature on RTP. However, the results and analysis in this paper
differ from the related work in several aspects:
In the work of [16], they analytically models the customers’ preferences and customers’
electricity consumption patterns in form of utility functions and it shows that the proposed
algorithm can benefit both customers and energy providers. However, no explicit form of
the customers’ utility functions is given. [8] and [18] further develop the work of [16]. Both
works use the same concept of utility functions to model the satisfaction of customers as [16],
but similarly no explicit form of the utility functions are given. As a result, the approach is
unable to help the customers to find the best scheme to minimize their bills. To overcome this
weakness, the approach given in this paper aims to provide the best solution for customers
to achieve the minimal bills.
Since the RTP design needs the participation of electricity retailer and its customers and
the decision makings are sequential, i.e., the electricity retailer announces the prices first,
then its customers react to the prices by shifting the energy use. The interactions between
electricity retailer and its customers can be represented as a leader-follower Stackelberg
game, and thus can be modelled using a bi-level programming model. In fact, the bi-level
programming problem is a static Stackelberg game where two players try to maximize their
individual objective functions [1].
Due to the hierarchical structure of the Stackelberg game or bi-level programming
model, many real-world problems with two decision levels can be modelled using the bi-level
programming approach. Price setting problems are two decision levels problems and have
been studied for several years using bi-level programming approach [14, 15, 7]. [2] proposes
a decision-making scheme for electricity retailers based on Stackelberg game. They model
the customers’ preference and satisfaction as utility functions. [4] presents an optimal
demand response scheduling with Stackelberg game approach. Similar to [2], they model
the customers’ behaviour patterns as utility functions. However, no explicit form of utility
functions are given. The difference between our work and [2] and [4] lies in that we model
the follower level problem (lower level problem) with appliance-level details, which is more
practical and thus more difficult to solve.
The main focus of this paper is to propose a decision making scheme based on bi-level
programming model for the electricity retailer and its customer by considering the benefits
of both participants and give efficient solutions to the proposed model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The background of bi-level programming
model is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, the system model and the solution method are
given. Experimental results are presented in Section 4. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
2 Background of Bi-level Programming Model
Decision making problems in decentralized organizations are often modelled as Stackelberg
games, and they are formulated as bi-level mathematical programming problems. The major
feature of a bi-level programming problem is that it includes two optimization problems
within a single instance. The lower level executes its own optimal policy after decisions are
made at the upper level [10].
The general formulation of a bi-level programming problem can be represented as follows:
(Upper Level) min
x
F (x, y)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0
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where y = y(x) is implicitly defined by:
(Lower Level) min
y
f(x, y)
s.t. g(x, y) ≤ 0
where F is the objective function of the upper level problem; f is the objective function of
the lower level problem; G is the constraint set of the upper level decision vector; g is the
constraint set of the lower level decision vector; x is the decision vector of the upper level;
and y is the decision vector of the lower level. y = y(x) is called reaction function. To solve
the bi-level programming model, one needs to obtain the reaction function by solving the
lower-level problem and replace the variable y in the upper level problem with the reaction
function [17]. However, for many real applications, the reaction function y = y(x) is not able
to be explicitly represented. Thus, the problems can not be handled in the above way and
become more difficult to solve.
Even though the simple linear bi-level programming problems are proven to be NP-hard,
there are many methods arising in the last thirty years for solving the bi-level programming
problems, such as the extreme-point approach for the linear bi-level programming, branch
and bound method, descent methods, penalty function methods and trust region methods
[5]. In this paper, the branch and bound method is chosen to solve our proposed bi-level
programming problems as this algorithm was proved to be able to obtain the global optimal
solutions [1].
3 System Model and Solution Method
In this section, we provide a mathematical representation of the considered decision making
problem. Firstly, our focus is to formulate the electricity consumption scheduling problem in
response to the real-time pricing in each household as an optimization problem that aims
to minimize the payment bills. Secondly, we model the profit optimization problem for the
retailer who will offer the 24 hours real-time prices to the customer.
We define P = [p1, p2, ..., ph, ...pH ] as the leader’s strategy space, where ph represents
the electricity price at hour h and H represents the scheduling time window. We assume
that pmin ≤ ph ≤ pmax, where pmin represents the minimum price that the retailer (utility
company) can offer to the customer and pmax represents the maximum price that the retailer
can offer. It is also reasonable to assume that the price that the retailers can offer is greater
than the wholesale price of each hour. The prices of pmin and pmax are usually designed
based on history data and conditions of the wholesale price. However, since most of the retail
markets now are regulated, there exists a price cap for the retail price and pmax should be
less than the price cap. For the following part of this paper, we set H , {1, 2, ...,H}. Usually,
H = 24. We define the set of appliances in the customer’s household S. In this paper, we
only consider the one-leader, one-follower case, i.e., in our model, only one electricity retailer
and one customer are considered.
3.1 Lower-level Model Problem
This model improves that of [13]. In their work, a upper limit for hourly electricity usage is
set for each household, but we do not have such constraints for the optimization problem at
customer’s side as there is no such usage limits in practice. Instead, we consider the total
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upper limit of hourly usage in the optimization problem at retailers’ side. This is to represent
the maximum load capacity of power networks. Therefore, we can actually control the hourly
use of electricity of each household by properly determining the retail price, which is more
practical from an application point of view.
For each appliance s ∈ S , we define an electricity consumption scheduling vector:
es = [e1s, ..., ehs , ..., eHs ] (1)
where H is the scheduling window. For each hour h ∈ H , {1, 2, ...,H}, ehs ≥ 0 represents
the customer’s electricity consumption of appliance s at time h.
It is reasonable to assume that the energy consumption of each appliance s during a
typical day is maintained at the same level and the total electricity consumed by appliance s
in a typical day is defined as Es. Moreover, the customer needs to set a valid scheduling
window Hs , {αs, ..., βs} by specifying the beginning operation time αs ∈ H and the end
operation time βs ∈ H of appliance s. Based on the above analysis, we have
βs∑
h=αs
ehs = Es (2)
and
ehs = 0,∀h ∈ H\Hs (3)
After defining the minimum power level γmins and the maximum power level γmaxs for
each appliance s ∈ S , we have
γmins ≤ ehs ≤ γmaxs ,∀h ∈ Hs. (4)
Then, the payment bill optimization problem for the customer can be modelled as follows:
min
ehs
∑H
h=1 p
h × (∑s∈S ehs )
s.t.∑βs
h=αs e
h
s = Es,
ehs = 0,∀h ∈ H\Hs,
γmins ≤ ehs ≤ γmaxs ,∀h ∈ Hs.
(5)
3.2 Upper-level Model Problem
In this section, we model the profit of the retailer by using the revenue subtracting the energy
cost imposed on the retailer. We will discuss about the energy cost model first, and then a
profit maximization model will be proposed.
In the practical application scenario, to determine the retail price, we need to consider
many factors such as running cost of the retailers including the payments incurred in the
wholesale market and so on. For simplicity, we define a cost function Ch(Lh) indicating the
cost of providing electricity by the retailers at each hour h ∈ H, where Lh represents the
amount of power provided to the customer at each hour of the day. We assume that the cost
function Ch(Lh) is increasing in Lh for each h [12, 8, 3]. In view of this, we design the cost
function as follows [12].
Ch(Lh) = ahLh + bh (6)
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where ah > 0 and bh ≥ 0 at each hour h ∈ H.
For each hour h ∈ H, by defining the minimum price that the retailer (utility company)
can offer pmin and the maximum price pmax, we have pmin ≤ ph ≤ pmax. Note that there is
usually a maximum load capacity, denoted as Emaxh , of power networks at each hour. Thus,
we have following constraints:∑
s∈S
ehs ≤ Emaxh ,∀h ∈ H (7)
Then the profit maximization problem can be modelled as (8).
max
ph
{ ∑
h∈H
ph × ∑
s∈S
ehs −
∑
h∈H
Ch(
∑
s∈S
ehs )}
s.t.
pmin ≤ ph ≤ pmax∑
s∈S
ehs ≤ Emaxh ,∀h ∈ H
(8)
3.3 Solution Method
Instead to solve the bi-level problem in its hierarchical form (Eqs.(8) and (5)), we convert
it into a standard mathematical program by replacing the follower’s problem (lower level
problem, Eq.(5)) with his Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. Then a branch and
bound algorithm is chosen to solve the resulting non-linear programming problem [1]. We
adopt the YALMIP solver, which is based on the above mentioned algorithm and implemented
in Matlab, to solve our bi-level programming mode [9].
4 Experimental Results
We simulate a simple one energy retailer (utility company), one customer case. It is assumed
that the customer has 4 appliances: dish washer, washing machine, clothes dryer and PHEV.
Note that the scheduling horizon is from 8AM to 8AM (the next day).
For the cost of the energy provided to the customer by utility company, we model this
as a cost function. We choose a simple linear cost function: Ch(Lh) = ahLh + bh , where
Lh represents the amount of power provided to the customer at each hour of the day. For
simplicity we assume that bh = 0 for all h ∈ H. Also, we have ah = 5.5 cents during the day,
i.e., from 8AM to 12AM and ah = 4.0 cents at night hours, i.e., from 13AM to 8AM (the
next day). Finally, the parameter settings of these home appliances can be found in Table 1.
Getting ideas from the time-of-use pricing (ToU), we divide the 24 hours prices into three
levels, i.e., peak hours( 5PM-12AM), mid-peak hours(8AM-5PM) and off-peak hours(12AM-
8AM). For peak hours, the prices range from 12 cents to 14 cents. Similarly, the prices range
Table 1 Home Appliances’ Parameter Settings.
Appliance Name Es Hs γmins γmaxs
Dish washer 1.8kwh 8PM-6AM 0.1kwh 1.0kwh
Washing machine 1.94kwh 8AM-8PM 0.1kwh 1.0kwh
Clothes dryer 3.4kwh 7PM-7AM 0.25kwh 3.0kwh
PHEV 9.9kwh 8PM-7AM 0.3kwh 2.0kwh
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Table 2 24 Hours Optimal Prices Offered by the Retailer.
Time 8AM 9AM 10AM 11AM 12PM 1PM 2PM 3PM
Price(cents) 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00
Time 4PM 5PM 6PM 7PM 8PM 9PM 10PM 11PM
Price (cents) 12.00 12.00 12.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00
Time 12AM 1AM 2AM 3AM 4AM 5AM 6AM 7AM
Price(cents) 14.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
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Figure 1 Optimal Real-time Prices Offered by the Retailer.
from 8 cents to 12 cents for mid-peak hours while the prices float between 6 cents to 10 cents
for off-peak hours.
The aim of our proposed optimal RTP scheme is to find the optimal 24 hours prices by
maximizing the retailer’s profit (upper level problem). Besides this, with this identified price
information, the customer can achieve his best benefit, i.e., minimize his payment bills (lower
level problem).
Applying the open source solver YALMIP to our proposed bi-level programming problems,
we can get the optimal 24 hours prices shown as Table 2 and Figure 1.
With the purpose to design a benchmark, we assume, without our proposed optimal
appliances scheduling scheme, the appliances start working right at the beginning of the time
interval Hs and at its typical power level. The energy consumption comparison of appliances
with and without scheduling can be seen from Figure 2. We can easily find from Figure 2
that the customer shifts the energy use from high price periods to low price period. As a
result, with our proposed scheduling scheme, the electricity bill of the customer for one day
is reduced from 2.35 $ to 1.94 $.
Based on the above analysis, we can see that with this bi-level programming model not
only the electricity retailer can maximize his benefits, but the customer can also benefit from
the reduced electricity bills.
Last but not least, the proposed branch and bound algorithm is more efficient compared
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Figure 2 Energy Consumption Comparison with Scheduling and without Scheduling under
Obtained Optimal Real-time Pricing.
with genetic algorithms used in [11]. Ten separate experiments for each approach have been
done for the computation time comparison. The average time cost of the genetic algorithm
approach in obtaining the optimal solution to our proposed bi-level programming model is
around 120 seconds while the branch and bound algorithm takes only around 8 seconds.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a bi-level programming approach to model the interactions between the retailer
and its customer. First, a electricity bill minimization model (lower level model) has been
proposed for the customer to incentive him to change his electricity use pattern. Second, a
profit maximization model (upper level model) for the retailer has been modelled. A branch
and bound algorithm is chosen to solve this propose bi-level programming problem. As
the simulation results show that both the retailer and the customer can benefit from the
proposed framework, it has great potential to improve the implementation of current energy
pricing programs, help customers to reduce the increasing energy bills, and change their
energy usage patterns.
This work can be extended in several directions. First, we will enrich the lower level
problem by considering the trade-off between minimizing bills and satisfying customer’s
comfort. Second, we will extend the current one-leader one follower case to one-leader
multiple-followers bi-level programming model in our future work.
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